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ABSTRACT
Language-based ecosystems (LBE), i.e., software ecosystems based
on a single programming language, are very common. Examples in-
clude the npm ecosystem for JavaScript, and PyPI for Python. These
environments encourage code reuse between packages, and incor-
porate utilities—package managers—for automatically resolving
dependencies. However, the same aspects that make these systems
popular—ease of publishing code and importing external code—also
create novel security issues, which have so far seen little study.
We present an a systematic study of security issues that plague
LBEs. These issues are inherent to the ways these ecosystems work
and cannot be resolved by fixing software vulnerabilities in either
the packages or the utilities, e.g., package manager tools, that build
these ecosystems. We systematically characterize recent security
attacks from various aspects, including attack strategies, vectors,
and goals. Our characterization and in-depth analysis of npm and
PyPI ecosystems, which represent the largest LBEs, covering nearly
one million packages indicates that these ecosystems make an op-
portune environment for attackers to incorporate stealthy attacks.
Overall, we argue that (i) fully automated detection of malicious
packages is likely to be unfeasible; however (ii) tools and metrics
that help developers assess the risk of including external dependen-
cies would go a long way toward preventing attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
A recent report by the software security company Contrast Security
found that 79% of application code came from third parties [38].
The use of third-party code has obvious benefits: it encourages
code reuse; it allows expertly-written and well-vetted codebases to
be deployed by more developers; and it leverages the knowledge
of the broader software development community even for highly-
custom projects. However, managing third-party components has
become increasingly complex. A complex web of dependencies
exists because third party components internally depend upon one
another. Furthermore, these components update out of step with
one another, introducing new functionality and behavior.
To ease the complexity and burden of navigating the use of third-
party code, a traditional solution has been to organize third-party
components into packages, which provide discrete modules of func-
tionality. The dependencies between packages are listed explicitly
as metadata within the package by third-party developers, and
packages are stored in an online database, or a package repository.
Much of the complexity of using packages is delegated to a utility
program called a package manager, which can navigate the web of
dependencies to find up-to-date versions of packages and ensure
that package dependencies are provided. A key goal of package
managers is that they abstract away the complexity of integrating
third-party functionality into a software project. However, the key
insight of our paper is that this abstraction introduces the potential
for stealthy attacks that may go undetected for long periods.
In this paper, we specifically study package management for
language-based ecosystems (LBEs), using the ecosystem of npm for
JavaScript/Node.js and PyPI for Python as case studies. Packages
from these ecosystems form the backbone of software development
in those specific languages by hosting third-party code that is reused
in many different software projects.
There exists some prior work studying software repositories
such as mobile app stores like Google Play and Apple App Store,
which serve consumers with full-fledged applications rather than
developers with re-usable code components, and OS package man-
agers such as RPM and Apt [8, 11, 13, 43, 44]. LBEs have received
much less attention, even though LBEs are inherently different from
other software repositories. We therefore focus our work on attacks
that arise inherently from the way LBEs work. As such, we consider
vulnerabilities in either the packages or the package management
system to be outside the scope of our work.
Previous work in both the industry and the academia has identi-
fied specific instances of malicious attacks on these package man-
agement ecosystems (e.g., [9, 17, 23]). Ourwork is the first to system-
atically study language-based ecosystems and presents a holistic
perspective on attacks in these ecosystems by providing a char-
acterization and taxonomy of attacks, and by analyzing package
repositories based on metrics that relate to potential for attacks.
Contributions. The contributions of our paper are as follow:
• We introduce a taxonomy of LBE compromises to charac-
terize the landscape of known attacks. We then use it to
categorize many notable examples of such attacks.
• We propose metrics for evaluating the risk and the impact
of package compromise. We believe these metrics serve as a
call to action for additional work in the domain.
• We perform case studies to characterize the state of two
popular package management ecosystems, npm and PyPI.
Our broad analysis of these two ecosystems and specific case
studies serve to demonstrate the use of our metrics and to
identify risks and security-relevant factors in current ecosys-
tems (such as developer behavior and the interconnectedness
of packages).
• We present concrete proposals for improving the security of
package managers against a class of attacks unique to this do-
main. Our proposals include best-practices for avoiding com-
mon mistakes that lead to compromises, and enhancements
to package manager software so that such compromises are
easier to avoid.
Our analysis includes npm and PyPI ecosystems, covering about
a million packages overall. We present important insights into
how social engineering attacks such as typo-squatting and import-
squatting may actually be flourishing.We find that due to the nature
of these ecosystems, there is no easy solution against such squatting
problems at the ecosystem level. At the same time, through our
characterization of past attacks, we find that much of these attacks
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can be effectively mitigated through simple feedback to developers
as they interact with the ecosystems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a broad background on package management ecosystems
and describes how our paper fits in. Section 3 presents a taxon-
omy of attacks on language package management ecosystems and
characterizes previous attacks based on this taxonomy. Section 4
further analyzes these ecosystems. In Section 5, we present recom-
mendations based on our attack characterization and analysis. We
then present related work, relevant discussions, and conclusions in
Sections 6,7, and 8, respectively.
2 BACKGROUND
Package managers, particularly those that focus on packages from
specific languages, play an essential role in software development.
The intention of such package managers is to provide modules of
high-quality code that can be reused efficiently by other developers.
As software complexity and the related maintenance effort increase,
it is all the more desirable to use third-party code as much as possi-
ble and have it automatically managed. Package managers fill in this
desideratum by keeping track of software dependencies (including
dependencies of dependencies) and taking care of compilation and
installation of these dependencies.
Different languages differ significantly in their package manage-
ment models and philosophies. Some language ecosystems have
a de facto package management repository. For instance, Python
has PyPI, JavaScript/Node.js has npm, Rust has Crates, and Java
(including all JVM languages) has Maven. These languages then
use various package managers such as pip for PyPI, npm and yarn
for npm (i.e., the npm repository), cargo for Crates, and mvn and
gradle for Maven, which pull data from these repositories and
provide other functionality such as handling project builds. Other
languages such as Go and C++ do not have specific repositories
where one may find most third-party code; instead the communities
in these languages prefer to directly use the disparate project repos-
itories (such as a project-specific GitHub repository). Moreover,
C++ has evolved a large number of different package managers
catering to different philosophies and platforms [1, 27]. Finally, the
OS package managers (e.g. RPM and Apt) in Unix systems pro-
vide some C/C++ libraries and so play a partial role as package
managers for C/C++. It is impossible to cover the specifics of each
language-based package management in one paper. We therefore
focus on a common package management model where there is
one de facto universal repository that hosts most of the third-party
code – Python, JavaScript, Rust, Java, Ruby, PHP, Perl and many
others follow this model. We study and present our findings on
the Python and JavaScript ecosystems as they are representative
of this model and have some of the largest user base and package
repositories.
Apart from package management for software development,
there exist other package managers and repositories. For instance,
mobile app stores, in particular, Google Play and Apple App Store
host millions of applications and are central to the Android and
iOS ecosystems. However, the focus of these repositories is more
on the consumer than the developer and hence handle different
challenges and security issues. For instance, while social engineer-
ing attacks would plague both a mobile app store and software
package repository like npm, the specific vectors of attacks will be
different: in a mobile app store, a user may, for example, be enticed
into installing a fake version of a game by deceptive imagery and
wording [6] while on a language package repository, the vector
may be typosquatting (Section 4). Likewise, traditional OS pack-
age managers and repositories like RPM and Apt face threats that
are different from those faced by language package managers. For
instance, OS package managers provide a well-deliberated set of
packages with assigned package maintainers who are often well-
known in the community while language-based ecosystems are
often much more relaxed with anyone allowed to upload packages
to the package repositories.
3 CHARACTERIZING PAST ATTACKS
In this section we discuss the characteristics of eight incidents in-
volving security compromise of package ecosystems. We selected
these incidents by reviewing news and reports from the last two
years containing descriptions of package manager-related incidents,
which resulted in 15 relevant unique incidents. We then discarded
7 incidents because they were out of scope (e.g., attacking soft-
ware bug in package management software rather than the ecosys-
tem [29]), or directed against traditional OS package ecosystems
(e.g., [40]). Table 1 summarize these incidents.
3.1 Overview
3.1.1 Threat Model. In our work, we focus on attacks that are
systemic to the LBEs themselves, i.e., they exploit some properties
of the ecosystems such as the densely connected nature of LBEs and
their dependency graphs, and low barriers to entry for publishing
packages. Therefore, we consider incidents involving an attacker
with any (or all) of the following capabilities:
(1) The attacker has the capability to publish an arbitrary num-
ber of new packages.
(2) The attacker can compromise existing developer accounts
via either social engineering, brute-forcing, misconfiguration
in package management infrastructure, or credential reuse1.
In all but one incidents considered, the attacker uses the means
above to create and hide malicious code in a package. Code may be
hidden in the application itself, or in the installation scripts shipped
with the package. We elaborate further on both approaches later in
this section.
3.1.2 Known Attack Instances. Due to space constraints, we only
discuss three representative incidents from our dataset in detail.
Readers may consult the respective references for other incidents.
npm typosquatting [33]. Between July 19th and 31st 2017, the
npm user account “HackTask” uploaded malicious packages to npm,
the de-facto standard package manager for Node.js. These packages
had names similar to existing, benign packages—an attack known
as typosquatting. For example, one of the malicious packages was
named crossenv, similar to the popular utility cross-env. All the
1While not every developer account can be compromised by these means, review
of past incidents shows that a non-trivial portion of developer accounts on popular
websites is vulnerable [12].
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Table 1: Summary of attacks discussed in the paper
Attack Notes Time-to-
discovery
event-stream compromise [17] Attacker turned the copay package into wallet-stealing tool by attack-
ing event-stream, on which copay has an indirect build dependency
46 days
Go-bindata account takeover [18] Github account for developer of popular go-bindata package (unmain-
tained at the time) re-created after owner deleted it
Same day
mailparser backdoor [10] Attacker added a dependency chain to popular but unmaintained mail-
parser package, terminating with a backdoored package
20 days
npm ESLint-scope password stealer [39] Attacker inserted credential-stealing code into ESLint-scope, a depen-
dency of the popular ESLint package which received seldom updates
Same day
conventional-changelog compromise [42] Attacker compromised popular, and actively maintained conventional-
changelog package inserting a cryptominer
1.5 days
npm typosquatting [33] Attacker uploaded 40 information-stealing packages with names simi-
lar to those of popular packages
12 days
PyPI backdoor [9] Attacker inserted malicious credential-collecting code in the (well-
maintained) PyPI ssh-decorate module
3 days
PyPI typosquatting [23] Attacker uploaded 10 malicious packages with names similar to those
of popular packages
99 days
Table 2: Framing of attacks within proposed taxonomies
Attack Type Strategy Vector Victims Goals
event-stream compromission [17] Influencer social engineering package code 2nd-party crypto theft
Go-bindata account takeover [18] Direct social engineering N/A 1st-party unknown
mailparser backdoor [10] Influencer credential stealing package code 2nd-party credential theft
npm ESLint-scope password stealer [39] Direct credential stealing installation script 1st-party credential theft
conventional-changelog compromise [42] Direct credential stealing package code 1st-party crypto theft
npm typosquatting [33] Bait social engineering installation script 1st-party credential theft
PyPI backdoor [9] Direct credential stealing package code 2nd-party credential theft
PyPI typosquatting [23] Bait social engineering installation script 1st-party dry run
malicious packages included an attack payload in one of the instal-
lation scripts; the payload was designed to ex-filtrate local environ-
mental variables (which oftentimes on development machines store
sensitive authentication tokens) to an attacker-controlled location.
The attack lasted 12 days before being discovered, and npm analysts
estimate that around 50 developers mistakenly downloaded mali-
cious packages instead of the original ones, and were thus affected
by the attack.
ESLint-scope password stealer [39]. In the night between July
11th and 12th 2018, an attacker used a compromised developer
account to publish a malicious version of the eslint-scope npm
package (a submodule of ESLint, a popular JavaScript code anal-
ysis toolkit). The package was altered to download and execute
a credential-stealing payload on installation. The payload copies
npmjs.org login credentials—stored in the .npmrc file—to an attacker-
controlled server. The attack was detected almost immediately, but
the ESLint development team estimated that up to 4,500 accounts
may have been compromised [16].
event-stream compromise [17]. This case study consists of a
complex, multi-stage attack against the users of the copay npm
package. In 2018, an attacker emailed the developer of a popular but
unmaintained npm package, event-stream, onwhich copay has an
indirect build dependency. The attacker offered to help with devel-
opment. After achieving access, on September 9th 2018 the attacker
injected a dependency on an external package in event-stream.
On October 5th, the application code of the external dependency
(flatmap-stream) was padded with a malicious payload. When
certain operations are executed specifically during the copay build-
ing process, the copay build was altered so that, when installed
and used, it ex-filtrated sensitive wallet information to an attacker-
controlled server. The attacker went undiscovered for 46 days, and
multiple official copay releases (5.0.2 to 5.1.0) were affected [34].
The amount of cryptocurrency stolen in the attack is unclear.
Review of the three cases above suggests that attacks against
package ecosystems can exhibit significant differences in terms
of approach and goals. In order to understand these difference
and support our analysis, we therefore developed a set of attack
taxonomies, which we illustrate below. Table 2 frames the attacks
under analysis within these taxonomies.
3.2 Attack types
In this work, we use various specific classes of attacks:
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• Bait attack: an attacker creates an appealing package, i.e.
one which is likely to be of interest to the community due
to some package features. One example of this category is
the typosquatting attacks [33], where a package is named
similarly to another, popular package.
• Direct attack: an attacker fraudulently and directly gains
access to the target package, and proceeds to inject malicious
payload in the code.
• Influencer attack: an attacker targets a package by insert-
ing malicious code into another package on which the victim
package depends. Attackers can leverage existing dependen-
cies, or inject new ones into the victim package through
various means. Both direct and build dependencies have
been leveraged in past incidents.
3.3 Strategy and factors affecting success
While bait attacks leverage unprivileged social engineering, direct
and influencer attacks require gaining some form of access and
publishing rights for an existing software package. Attackers may
break into existing developers’ accounts [12] (e.g., by exploiting
credential reuse), or simply volunteer to help [17]. A different ap-
proach entails re-creating a package under the name of a popular
one which has been removed [18].
All attacks need to deploy malicious code before being detected.
Code obfuscation and payload encryption are sometimes used for
this purpose [17]. For direct and influencer attacks, the attacker
may also attempt to select target packages which have gone un-
maintained [10], in the hope that malicious commits may undergo
less scrutiny. We note, however, that actively developed packages
have been targeted too [42]. While evidence is too limited for quan-
titative analysis, data in Table 1 suggests that deliberately choosing
to target unmaintained packages may prolong the attack.
A related challenge for the attacker is ensuring that attack code
is spread widely2. In a bait attack the attacker attempts to engineer
packages that are likely to appeal to the community. The attacks
we consider achieve this by typosquatting, however alternative
approaches are possible. Examples include creating a package pur-
porting to offer a desirable functionality [40], or artificially inflating
package popularity metrics (e.g., by repeatedly downloading it, or
sending pull requests that inflate the number of packages depend-
ing on it [20]). In direct and influencer attacks, attackers tend to
choose victim packages which are either already popular [17], or
are dependencies of other, popular packages [39].
3.4 Attack vector
For attacks that do attain the goal of injecting malicious code, it is
useful to consider where the malicious code resides:
• Package code: attack payload executes when the package
is loaded or functions within the package are executed. For
indirect attacks, the attack code resides within a dependency
which must be imported and used for the attack to work.
• Installation script: virtually all package managers offer
the ability to execute custom scripts during various stages
of package installation. Injecting attack code within these
2While targeted attacks are in principle possible, we have not observed them in our
dataset. We note, however, that such attacks would be more likely to go undetected.
npm: 801674PyPI: 130630
Ubuntu 19.04: 30461
MacPorts: 4597
Figure 1: Ecosystem size comparison (circle area is propor-
tional to number of packages in each ecosystem)
scripts ensures that the attack is executed even if the package
code itself is never actually used.
It should be noted that, regardless of how attack code is executed,
it is in principle possible for the payload to persist the attack, e.g.
by creating init scripts to re-execute the attack at every boot [40]
or by adding code .bashrc or .bash_profile [30].
3.5 Attacker victims and goals
We define two classes of attack victims:
• First-party victims: developers taking part in and con-
tributing to the package ecosystem.
• Second-party victims: users of applications based on com-
promised packages.
While attacks against second-party victims have been rare so far,
they outline a concerning scenario. In fact, these attacks may affect
a large number of nontechnical users who are unfamiliar with the
package ecosystem and the risk of attacks. Next, we look at possible
attacker goals:
• Dry-run:we include in this category attacks with a payload
with limited or no malicious effect. Such attacks may have
been carried by researchers, or by cybercriminals evaluating
their tools.
• Cryptocurrency theft: this type of attack aims at injecting
code which either executes cryptomining, or attempts to
steal funds. The former goal in particular is ideally suited
to the characteristics of these attacks, which are typically
discovered quickly but may reach a large number of users.
• Credential theft: this type of attacks attempts to identify
and appropriate credentials and/or sensitive information of
either developers or application users.
Our analysis suggests that security risks in LBEs chiefly originate
from three factors: the ecosystems’ scale, their interconnectedness,
and the prevalence of package abandonment. In the next section, we
consider metrics to capture each factor.We then perform ecosystem-
wide analyses for typosquatting attacks. Many of the real-world
incidents belong this attack class.
4 ANALYSIS OF ECOSYSTEMS
In this section, we elaborate upon our characterization study de-
scribed in Section 3. We discuss the various factors that contribute
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to the risk and impact of attacks on LBEs in detail. We then analyze
one class of attacks which has proven particularly popular, despite
the apparent ease of detection: that of typosquatting.
4.1 Methodology
Our analysis is based on package metadata scraped from pub-
licly available LBEs: npm offers a web-based API [32] to retrieve
metadata for the entire package dependency graph. It includes
the number of dependencies of each package version, the author,
maintainer information and other package-related metadata. Per-
package download counts are available through a different npm API
endpoint [31], which we used for our npm popularity findings (Fig-
ure 2). Unlike npm, PyPI does not expose a dedicated API of depen-
dency metadata. Thus, we resorted to downloading each package
and examining its setup.py script, which explicitly lists dependen-
cies via the install_requires parameter. Although examining
each package’s setup file has been used in prior work [21, 24], the
dependency list itself may be modified by the setup script during
execution resulting in incorrect results. Nevertheless, we feel the
approach is a reasonable approximation for counting dependencies.
For package popularity, we fetched the download information by
crawling PyPI website (as it keeps the download information on
the package homepage). Our npm and PyPI data snapshots were
captured between December 2018 and January 2019.
4.2 Ecosystem Evaluation
In Section 3, we identified three factors that contribute to the risk of
falling victim to an attack on an LBE: the ecosystem scale, structure,
and abandonment. We evaluate each of these factors in turn.
4.2.1 Analysis of ecosystem scale. A key aspect of language-based
ecosystems is their scale, that far surpasses that of traditional pack-
age management systems. Figure 1 provides a visual comparison
between the number of packages in npm and PyPI at the time of
this study, to the number of packages in MacPorts (a distribution of
Unix utilities for the MacOS operating system) and a recent Ubuntu
version (package counts for the latter two are based on statistics
from [2]). The rate of growth is also staggering: respectively 400
and 100 packages/day for npm and PyPI.
The overall number of package downloads at the time of our
snapshot was 244B for npm and 23B for PyPI. However, when look-
ing at download counts for individual package, extreme differences
emerge. For example, in npm (PyPI) the 20 most popular packages
count for nearly 6% (33%)of the overall numbers of package down-
loads (note that these ecosystems include 100K to 1M packages!). A
list of popular packages is presented in Figure 2. We note however
that there exists a long tail of packages with non-negligible (>=
1000) download counts. The number of such packages is 160439
for npm, and 117524 for PyPI. We also remark—without further
comment—that download counts distribution in both ecosystems
appears to follow a power-law, at least for packages with high
download counts (we use 104 as lower bound for fitting). Figure 3
shows the CCDF of both quantities and that of the fitted distribution
(for npm α = 1.44; for PyPI, α = 1.83).
In terms of scale, modern language-based ecosystems are there-
fore closer to mobile app stores than traditional package manage-
ment systems, and are likely to suffer from similar problems. First,
Table 3: Characterization of package dependency graphs
(without disconnected nodes)
npm PyPI
#Nodes 577943 84188
Avg node outdegree 4.27 2.95
Avg dependency tree size 86.55 7.33
Avg dependency tree depth 4.39 1.71
the scale and growth rate of these ecosystems strongly suggest that
it is impossible for human maintainers to manually vet and curate
the set of packages. Even automated analysis of packages (e.g. to
identify known malicious code) must be extremely efficient to keep
up with the rate of growth. Second, updates to popular packages can
reach a large numbers of user extremely rapidly. The combination
of limited vetting and widespread distribution generates signifi-
cant potential security risks due to injection of malicious packages.
However, LBEs have seen little analysis, especially compared to
the scrutiny of the Android and IoS mobile ecosystems (which we
discuss in Section 6).
4.2.2 Analysis of ecosystems structure. An important difference
between package management systems and app stores is the inter-
dependence between packages. The vast majority of all packages
reuse code from other packages, and/or require other packages
in order to be built. As a result, in many circumstances packages
may be downloaded and set up indirectly, as dependencies of other
packages. Furthermore, there may be no occasion for a developer
to explicitly review of the set of packages being installed a priori,
e.g. if dependencies are resolved by an automated build pipeline.
It is therefore crucial to understand the degree to which packages
depend on each other, as the attack surface of a package effectively
includes all of its dependencies.
We note that measuring package dependencies is an ill-defined
problem, as package ecosystems evolve and different versions of
the same package may have different sets of dependencies. In this
work, we chose to use dependencies of the latest package version,
as the latest version is most likely to be downloaded by users (pip
install packageName or npm install packageName installs
the most recent supported version by default). We also evaluated
aggregating dependencies across all version of each package. As
results do not change significantly, we omit them for brevity’s sake.
First, we note that 28% of npm packages and 36% of PyPI pack-
ages do not have any dependencies or dependents. As the purpose
of this section is to evaluate the potential impact of package depen-
dencies, the statistics presented here are computed after removing
these disconnected nodes from the graph. For the remaining nodes,
Table 3 quantitatively characterize various properties of the pack-
age dependency graph. Node outdegree represents the number of
direct dependencies3. Dependency tree size is the number of direct
and indirect dependencies (size of transitive closure), while De-
pendency tree depth is the length of the longest dependency chain.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of dependency tree sizes (transi-
tive closures).
3We use the convention that a direct edge between packages p1 and p2 signifies that
p1 depends on p2 .
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Figure 2: Packages with highest download counts for each ecosystem
Table 3 reveals that in both the ecosystems, on average, each
package has more than two dependencies. Dependency trees tend
to be small and shallow in PyPI, while in npm the average depth
of a package dependency chain is >4, and the overall number of
dependencies is nearly 90! This suggests a difference in development
practices between ecosystems. While in PyPI developers seem to
behave conservatively when incorporating external code in their
packages, npm culture favors packaging and code reuse at the
granularity of individual functions [25].
Regardless of these differences, however, the analysis confirms
that packages in language-based ecosystems are tightly intercon-
nected. Figure 4 shows that in npm and PyPI 20% of packages have
respective more than 100 and 10 cumulative dependencies. While
there is no direct negative implication for security, a large set of
dependencies presents a greater attack surface on a package. An-
other obvious metric that can be tied to security is abandonment,
which we analyze next.
4.2.3 Analysis of package abandonment. One of the strategies used
in past incidents is to focus attack efforts against packages that are
rarely or never maintained, since they are less likely to undergo
scrutiny. We therefore turn our attention to such packages.
Based on past work[15], we use lack of releases over the last
12 months as a proxy for package abandonment. Using this met-
ric, we calculated total abandoned packages in npm as well as in
PyPI repository. We note that this metric is likely to overestimate
abandonment. Particularly in the npm ecosystem, many packages
have extremely low complexity and consist of only a few lines of
code; it is possible that for some of these the maintainer has simply
decided that the code is perfect and does not need further updates.
However, we decided to not distinguish between abandoned and
completed packages, as the problem is ambiguous and ill-defined.
In our analysis, we found that in npm about 496k packages
(of about 801k) have been abandoned (i.e. about 61%), while in
PyPI about 74k packages (of about 130k) have been abandoned (i.e.
about 57%). Figure 5 shows abandoned packages with the highest
download counts for npm and PyPI. Furthermore, while one may
expect download count to be inversely correlated to probability of
abandonment (i.e., that popular packages are less likely to become
abandoned), we found no support for such hypothesis in the data.
While this may be due to limited number of samples for high down-
load counts, Figure 5 provides empirical evidence of abandoned
packages with hundreds of thousands of download. Cumulative
download count for abandoned packages approaches the billions
in both ecosystems.
Overall, the fact that abandonment seems common even for
highly downloaded packages is alarming because in the past attack-
ers have successfully commandeered abandoned packages [17]. We
discuss some possible countermeasures in Section 5.
4.3 Summary of Evaluation Results
Our analysis determined that language-based ecosystems include a
large number of packages with heavy-tailed distribution of the num-
ber of downloads, suggesting a malicious package has the potential
to reach a large number of users. Furthermore, packages tend to
have many dependencies, which increases their attack surface and
makes it more likely for an attacker to find a viable victim package.
Combined with our finding that many highly popular packages
appear abandoned by their maintainer, LBEs are fertile ground for
attacks injecting malicious code into the ecosystem. Indeed, some
attacks exploiting these factors have already happened [17, 39].
To explore these issues with more specificity, we undertook
case studies for the particular issue of typosquatting in two large
LBEs, npm and PyPI. In a typosquatting attack, a developer injects
a malicious package into the ecosystem with a name similar to
that of another, benign package (according to the terminology of
Section 3.2 this is a form of bait attack). We decided to focus on
this class of attacks because they have happened repeatedly in the
past [23, 33], despite the apparent ease of detection.
4.4 Case Study #1: Typosquatting in npm
In order to assess why different packages end up having similar
names, we first identified all pairs of npm packages whose names
differ by 1 character (i.e., string edit distance is 1). This step returned
326K candidate pairs. A quick analysis shows that most packages
with very short names are part of one of such pairs (e.g., 95% of
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Figure 3: Power-law distribution fit for download counts
packages with name-length = 3; this percentage decreases to 71% for
name-length = 5, and 16% for name-length = 10). These similarities
are bound to happen purely due to the size of the ecosystem: there
are nearly 8000 3-letter packages in npm, and only 17576 combina-
tions of three lowercase English letters4. Therefore, attempting to
identify typosquatting in short package names purely by comparing
name pairs is bound to be fruitless.
One may ask whether the same approach—marking similarly-
named packages as suspicious—may work at least for packages with
longer names, since similarities occur less frequently. In order to
answer this question, we filtered our set of similarly-named package
pairs to retain only those where package names have lengths 10 or
above. The filtering step returned 27K package pairs, from which
we randomly selected and manually analyzed 100 pairs.
A lone “undecidable” package was so marked because the distri-
bution archive is missing from npm servers. Most of the remaining
pairs (89) were labeled as “benign”—name similarities due either
to coincidence, because packages were implementing similar func-
tionality, or to the fact that one package was derived from the other
(e.g., a fork) for benign reasons. We furthermore identified nine
“suspicious” cases. Six consisted of empty/dummy packages named
similarly to a legitimated packages, while three consisted of pack-
age pairs sharing substantial amount of codes without reasonable
explanation or ties.
Finally, we marked one case as “malicious”. This case involves
the pair agario-client and agario-clients. The latter is a near
code clone of the former, which is a (now outdated) client for the
agar.io browser-based game. However, agario-clients includes
modifications which appear to redirect users to a different game
server. Furthermore, its authors attempted to masquerade their
package by manipulating package metadata in package.json—e.g.
_shasum—to mimic those of agario-client. While this approach
was ineffective (npm ignores such metadata as they are computed
on the server side), it clearly shows the intention to make one
package pass as the other.
Our brief analysis highlights a few interesting facts. First, it ap-
pears that typosquatting continues to happen in the wild, and it is
likely that there are yet undiscovered cases. Second, there are no
barriers - at least in the npm ecosystem - to prevent anyone from
registering a package with a name close to that of a highly popular
4Names can use other symbols, however most short names do not include them.
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Figure 4: CDF of dependency tree sizes for each ecosystem
one, which may generate confusion. For example, graphql-tools
and graphql-tool could be easily confused, but the former is a pop-
ular package with 500k downloads/week, while the latter appears
to be a set of Angular.js programming exercises archived together.
Despite not providing any usable functionality, it still managed to
accrue 600 downloads since it was uploaded. Furthermore, there
are many legitimate reasons why packages may be named similarly,
and most instances in which this happens are in fact benign.
Finally, since several pairs in the “suspicious” and “malicious”
sets involved code cloning, one may suggest that code similarity
would be a useful additional feature to distinguish false and true
positives. Unfortunately, using a simple similarity metric based on
file hashes revealed that nine of the benign package pairs also had
significant similarities, all due to benign reasons. Overall, this anal-
ysis suggests that it may be difficult to distinguish typosquatting
attacks from benign occurrences in an automated fashion.
4.5 Case Study #2: Import-squatting in PyPI
Python packages present another attack vector, which we call
import-squatting and which is a variant of typosquatting. The pos-
sibility of this attack has been known to the community for some
time [5]. In the attack scenario, the name of the package differs
from the top-level module name provided by the package. A python
package provides one or more modules and it is the module name
that is used to load the module through the import statement. It
is typical for the package name to be the same as the name of
the module it provides. However, this equivalence is not enforced.
To consider a real-world example, the beautifulsoup4 package,
which is one of the most popular packages on PyPI, provides the
module bs4. It is not surprising to have an unsuspecting user at-
tempt to install this package by specifying the name bs4 rather
than beautifulsoup4. The risk of confusion is high enough that
the authors of beautifulsoup4 maintain a separate dummy bs4
package to prevent someone from exploiting the problem by adding
a malicious bs4 package [5].
PyPI does not directly provide package metadata that would
indicate which modules are provided by a package. We therefore
downloaded the packages, and inspected their file organization to
obtain information about module names. Because the setup script
of the package can create modules during package installation and
modules can be created (by other modules) during code execution, it
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Figure 5: Abandoned Packages with highest download counts for each ecosystem
is possible that our results are incomplete. However, we believe we
have a reasonable approximation to identify modules in a package.
We found about 3,500 candidates of import-squatting. We man-
ually analyzed 50 cases, but did not find any evidence of import-
squatting. To cite an interesting example here, the package named
requirements-parser (about 462k downloads) provides a top-
level module named requirements. There also exists another pack-
age "requirements", whichwemarked as likely benign, but clearly
fits our criterion for import-squatting. We believe that import-
squatting can be a serious threat and package maintainers should
exercise due caution to protect their users.
5 RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, we recommend ways to mitigate the threats faced by
LBEs. Our recommendations are inspired by the characteristics of
attacks that we have witnessed in the wild and leverage the metrics
that we looked at in Section 4.
We highlight two main categories of recommendations:
(1) Technology to detect and avoid attacks in LBEs. We recom-
mend a software enhancement to package managers we call
obscurity alerts that warns users when they heuristically
identified to be installing the wrong package.
(2) Best practices to employ in LBEs. We recommend techniques
that developers, users, andmaintainers could use to avoid the
circumstances that attackers have exploited in past attacks.
5.1 Obscurity Alerts
Although the popularity of a package can serve as an enticement
for that package to be attacked, it can also serve as a means of de-
fense against various “squatting” attacks. In particular, the package
manager can detect when a user requests an obscure package with
a name that is likely to be confused with a more popular package.
Under such circumstances, the package manager can warn the user
that they may have made a mistaken request and may be about to
fall victim to a squatting attack. We refer to such an warning as
an obscurity alert. The metrics that we introduce identify packages
where squatting attacks are a high-risk and/or high-impact. As
such, this information can be leveraged for issuing obscurity alerts.
As we noted in Section 4, package repositories already collect
information that characterizes the risk and impact of squatting at-
tacks: they can identify popular packages, and knowwhen packages
have similar names. We recommend that package manager software
actively identify and caution users by requesting additional confir-
mation from before installing the near-match packages. We note
that our metrics can be used by package developers and package
consumers to mitigate several of the attack scenarios of Section 3.
We discuss the use of our metrics in each of these contexts below.
5.1.1 Protecting package consumers. The most obvious use of an
obscurity alert is to protect users of package managers from falling
victim to typosquatting-style attacks. In this regard, the most im-
portant metric for detecting an attack is edit-distance. However, as
noted above, simply comparing a package name against all other
package names presents a naive picture of which packages are in-
tended. Instead, when a user installs a package, we first check if it
is an obscure package with a name that is close to a popular one.
5.1.2 Protecting package developers. The primary way in which ob-
scurity alerts aid package developers is the same way in which they
aid application developers: by interposing on the direct inclusion of
a package in a project and alerting the user to suspicious packages.
We note that the purpose of our tool is not to prevent package
developers from intentionally including obscure packages as de-
pendencies, nor is it to prevent package consumers from relying on
such packages. We simply observe that the use of obscure packages
is rare by definition and thus should be treated with heightened
alertness. As such, should an obscurity alert be raised, our tool
simply asks users if they are sure that they did not intend to use
the more-popular package name, and allows the installation of the
obscure package with user input.
Additionally, several of the attacks described in Section 3 relied
on legitimate developers missing the actions of a malicious con-
tributor. These attacks were characterized by developers who were
no longer frequently updating the package, allowing an adversary
(perhaps with compromised credentials) to slip a malicious update
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into the package under low scrutiny. The damage of such attacks is
multiplied by other packages obliviously pulling in those changes
as part of an update. Thus, we also recommend obscurity alerts be
issued when pulling package updates to packages that have been
abandoned (under our metric, a package is considered abandoned
if it has not been updated in the last 12 months).
We emphasize that obscurity alerts are warnings only: a key find-
ing of our work is that automatically detecting malicious packages
is very difficult, and only the consumer of a package can tell if she
made a typo during the request. However, this class of attacks relies
on a lack of attention on the part of package consumers. If they can
be alerted in the few risky cases where a typosquatting attack may
happen, the threat vector becomes significantly reduced.
5.2 Best Practices
Many of the attacks that we have encountered upon package man-
agers could be avoided with more rigorous policies and greater
scrutiny of package manager ecosystems. While crafting complete
audit policies is beyond the scope of this work, we consider some
general guidelines that may be helpful in mitigating attacks.
For package repository maintainers As noted above, greater
scrutiny of package uploads could likely have prevented many of
the known attacks on ecosystems. Unfortunately, popular pack-
age repositories may contain hundreds of thousands of packages,
so manual analysis of every package is impractical for repository
maintainers. Nevertheless, we believe that repositories should col-
lect and report robust statistics about the use of packages such
that individual package developers can leverage statistical data to
identify likely mistakes. We also note that the more possible aliases
a package uses, the greater the likelihood of confusion. As such,
we recommend that in cases where the package manager allows
imports under a different name as the package itself, the difference
is reported in the management tool. Downloading a package with
an import already taken by a different package may indicate confu-
sion, and package maintainers should consider alerting users to be
cautious in such cases.
For package developers Ultimately, package developers will nec-
essarily be responsible for much of the security of their package.
Broadly, we recommend that developers maintain good security
hygiene with regards to their credentials, avoid password reuse,
and update credentials frequently. We also note that when choosing
packages to include as dependencies, package developers take on
the role of package users, and thus should follow the recommenda-
tions below.
For package usersWe recommend that all developers leverage the
metrics that we propose when considering inclusion of a package
into a project. Furthermore, when a package passes a threshold
such that it is deemed suspicious, developers should consider check-
ing the update, reading the changelog if present, and determining
whether the package appears to have recently changed ownership.
Such practices would have flagged many of the attacks seen in the
past and are likely to be a good indicator of malicious influence in
the future.
6 RELATEDWORK
Literature presents many analyses of software ecosystems; how-
ever, most do not focus on security-related aspects. Examples in-
clude [19, 37, 45]. While these works present useful information for
understanding these complex objects, they do not consider the issue
of attackers distributing malicious software by exploiting flaws in
an ecosystem’s structure.
Probably the earliest analysis of the security of a package ecosys-
tem is Cappos et al.’s analysis of Linux and FreeBSD package man-
agers [8]. This paper predates some language ecosystems such as
npm, and it is concerned with issues in the package distribution
system and supporting applications rather than the ecosystem itself.
Also, Athalye et al [3] analyzed the security of cryptographic oper-
ations performed by package managers, such as ensuring integrity,
authenticity and transport-level security. Furthermore, recent work
by Pfretzschner and ben Othmane [35] performed an analysis of
possible attack techniques that a malicious package, injected as
dependency, may use to attack an application. None of these works
reviewed actual incidents or performed any measurement on the
entity of the problem.
The work most closely related to ours is perhaps Hejderup’s
master thesis [26]. This work quantifies the presence of vulnerable
packages within the npm repository, and the extent to which other
packages depend - directly or indirectly - on them. This analysis is
relevant to ours, as it establishes useful practices for quantitative
analysis of a package dependency graph. However, our scope is
clearly different from this work—we consider attacks that are inher-
ent to LBEs rather than those arising from software vulnerabilities.
A related line of work is on the study of application ecosystems,
most recently of mobile applicationmarkets such as the Google Play
store [11, 13, 43, 44]. These works are primarily concerned with
applications used by consumers, rather than application compo-
nents (i.e. packages) that are specific to the language ecosystem and
are used by developers. As such, characterization of app markets
(and defenses proposed against malicious applications) are largely
orthogonal to our work. The closest work to our own is in the de-
tection of cloned applications, whereby a lesser-known or actively
malicious developer will re-package and re-publish a better-known
app. Detecting application clones has typically been done via code
similarity metrics [22] or behavior [14]. In contrast, our approach
is based entirely on the metadata of the entire package repository.
Other authors have looked at the more general problem of supply
chain vulnerabilities, i.e., vulnerabilities in the open-source appli-
cations on which a software package depends. Tellnes’ Master’s
thesis [41] investigates the effect of various classes of dependencies
(including those among software components) on the reliability of
a system. Various approaches to the containment of vulnerable de-
pendencies are proposed, such as secure wrappers. However, such
approaches are explicitly designed for "benign" failure scenarios
and unlikely to be effective against malicious dependency injections.
Cadariu et al. [7] investigated vulnerable dependencies in a set of
75 production systems in the Netherlands, finding that over 70% of
these contained at least 1 vulnerable dependency. None of these
studies considered maliciously-injected dependencies. Other works,
such as those by Younis et al. [46] and Platte et al. [36], aim at reli-
ably assessing the concrete impact of vulnerable dependencies on
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an application. These works are orthogonal to ours, though similar
techniques could potentially be applied to determine the impact of
malicious dependency injection. Finally, Kula et al. [28] propose var-
ious plotting techniques to convey complex dependency relations.
Effectively presenting this information to application developers
can help avoiding dependencies on untrusted libraries.
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Limitations
Our study is a first foray into the security issues that affect language-
based ecosystems, and we make no claim for it to be exhaustive.
Many of our conclusions remain qualitative, because there is just
not enough evidence to support quantitative analysis. For example,
data and intuition seem to support a correlation between degree
of abandonment of a package and time between attack and dis-
covery. However, many more data points would be required for a
convincing statistical analysis. Furthermore, some aspects of the
problem are intrinsically impossible to measure: our analysis of
import-squatting is by necessity incomplete, as there are no reliable
mean to identify all modules of a Python package.
Despite these limitations, we believe there is value in calling
attention to ecosystem attacks, and analyzing the data which is
available. These are a dangerous and novel security threat, and
while high-profile incidents have occurred, analysis of the phenom-
enon so far has been limited. By presenting a preliminary analysis
and outlining possible defensive approaches, we hope to begin a
discussion within the community on how to solve these issues.
7.2 Future Work
We plan to explore in depth the advantages and pitfalls of various
approaches to contain ecosystem attacks. For example, npm im-
plements a shrinkwrap command which freezes dependencies to
specific package versions. While preventing future injection attacks
to succeed, however, this approach has the drawback of also locking
buggy or insecure versions, not allowing them to be updated. It is
unclear whether the advantages outweigh the risk of disseminating
unpatchable vulnerabilities.
Even from our limited data, it is clear that letting packages run
arbitrary scripts as root during installation—the model employed by
OS packagemanagers—is outdated and dangerous. At the same time,
package installation by its nature may require modifications to file
system and execution of code to configure the system. A possible
solution is a access control model for package installation scripts,
which would restrict installers to the minimum set of privileges
necessary to accomplish their function (principle of least privilege),
e.g., by restricting them to a given directory. Further analysis is
necessary to determine whether a permissions system would be
effective in preventing attacks without posing unacceptable burden
on package developers, especially as packages change frequently,
so may change the required capabilities.
A different question is whether ecosystem attacks can be auto-
matically detected. Our analysis has characterized several classes
of ecosystem attacks, each working in different ways. As such, our
findings indicate that there is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach to ecosystem attack detection. Furthermore, the size of the
ecosystem—and the rate at which packages are submitted (about
100 to 400 packages daily, depending on the ecosystem)—implies
that even if malicious packages were to be injected frequently, they
are likely to constitute extremely rare events. More generally, any
defense must have a minimal need for maintenance on part of the
ecosystem maintainers. Even a detector with high accuracy there-
foremay incur the base rate fallacy [4]—i.e., alerts are overwhelming
likely to be false positives. This conclusion is also supported by the
observation, made in Section 4 in the context of typosquatting, that
benign, innocuous packages that are nearly indistinguishable from
malicious ones have been generated in practice. All this suggests
that any automated detection approach must err on the side of false
negatives, to ensure that the rate at which warnings are generated
remains low enough to be analyzed by human maintainers.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a multi-faceted analysis of the security
risks inherent in the structure of language-based ecosystems. Our
first contribution is a taxonomy of attacks based on past incidents,
which we hope will help structuring discussions and analyses of
such issues. Our second contribution consists of an analysis of two
representative ecosystems, the npm and PyPI ecosystems. We per-
formed measurements of the structure of these ecosystems, and
took an in-depth look at some classes of attacks, which we used as
the foundation of our third contribution: a set of guidelines to con-
tain future attacks. Overall, we found that malicious packages are
hard to disambiguate from benign ones, and the scale of ecosystems
prevents manual analysis by ecosystem maintainers. However, pro-
viding decision support tools to developers is likely to be effective.
Indeed, when assessing whether to include an external package
poses a security risks, developers are best positioned to make the
decision as they are the most aware of the context.
We remark that while there has been so far a limited number
of attacks, evidence suggests that these ecosystems are ripe for
exploitation, and the number of incidents will only increase in the
future. However, in contrast with other software ecosystems such
as mobile app stores, there has been limited work on the nature of
the issue and on possible solutions. By shedding light on the nature
of the problem, we hope that our work will foster further research
on the security of LBEs.
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